Secure Computation of the kth-Ranked Element in a Star Network by Tueno, Anselme et al.
Secure Computation of the kth-Ranked Element
in a Star Network
Anselme Tueno1, Florian Kerschbaum2, Stefan Katzenbeisser3, Yordan Boev4,
and Mubashir Qureshi5
1 SAP SE, Germany anselme.kemgne.tueno@sap.com
2 University of Waterloo, Canada florian.kerschbaum@uwaterloo.ca
3 University of Passau, Germany Stefan.Katzenbeisser@uni-passau.de
4 SAP SE, Germany iordan.boev@gmail.com
5 SAP SE, Germany mubashir.mehmood.qureshi01@sap.com
Abstract. We consider the problem of securely computing the kth-
ranked element in a sequence of n private integers distributed among
n parties. The kth-ranked element (e.g., minimum, maximum, median)
is of particular interest in benchmarking, which allows a company to
compare its own key performance indicator to the statistics of its peer
group. The individual integers are sensitive data, yet the kth-ranked el-
ement is of mutual interest to the parties. Previous secure computation
protocols for the kth-ranked element require a communication channel
between each pair of parties. They do not scale to a large number of par-
ties as they are highly interactive resulting in longer delays. Moreover,
they are difficult to deploy as special arrangements are required between
each pair of parties to establish a secure connection. A server model nat-
urally fits with the client-server architecture of Internet applications in
which clients are connected to the server and not to other clients. It can
simplify secure computation by reducing the number of rounds, and as a
result, improve its performance and scalability. In this model, there are
communication channels only between each client and the server, while
only clients provide inputs to the computation. Hence, it is a central-
ized communication pattern, i.e., a star network. We propose different
approaches for privately computing the kth-ranked element in the server
model, using either garbled circuits or threshold homomorphic encryp-
tion. Our schemes have a constant number of rounds and can compute
the kth-ranked element within seconds for up to 50 clients in a WAN.
1 Introduction
Given n parties each holding a private integer, we consider the problem of se-
curely computing the kth-ranked element (KRE) of these n integers. This is a
secure multiparty computation (SMC) where several parties wish to compute a
publicly known function on their private input while revealing only the output
of the computation to a designated subset of parties and nothing else. The com-
putation of the kth-ranked element is of particular interest in settings such as
collaborative benchmarking, where the individual inputs are sensitive data, yet
the kth-ranked element is of mutual interest to all parties [2, 26].
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Benchmarking. A key performance indicator (KPI) is a statistical quantity
measuring the performance of a business process. Benchmarking is a manage-
ment process where a company compares its KPI to the statistics of the same
KPIs of a group of competitors from a peer group. Examples of KPIs from
different company operations are make cycle time (manufacturing), cash flow
(financial) and employee fluctuation rate (human resources). A peer group is
a group of similar companies, usually competitors, wanting to compare against
each other. Examples formed along different characteristics include car manufac-
turers (industry sector), Fortune 500 companies in the United States (revenue
and location). A big challenge for benchmarking is that KPIs are sensitive and
confidential, even within a single company [26].
Confidentiality. Confidentiality is of the utmost importance in benchmarking,
since KPIs allow the inference of sensitive information. Companies are therefore
hesitant to share their business performance data due to the risk of losing a
competitive advantage [26]. The confidentiality issue can be addressed using
SMC [4,19,37], which guarantees that no party will learn more than the output
of the protocol, i.e., the other parties’ inputs remain confidential.
Communication Model. There exist several secure protocols that can be used
for keeping KPIs confidential while comparing them [2,4,19,37]. They require a
communication channel between each pair of input parties. We will refer to this
approach as the standard model. Protocols in the standard model do not scale
easily to a large number of parties as they require a communication channel
between any pair of parties and are highly interactive, resulting in high latency.
Moreover, they are difficult to deploy as special arrangements are required be-
tween each pair of parties to establish a secure connection [10]. A promising
approach for overcoming these limitations is to use the help of a small set of un-
trusted non-colluding servers. We will therefore refer to it as the server model. In
this model, the servers make their computational resources available for the com-
putation, but have no input to the computation and receive no output [24, 26].
For example, Jakobsen et al. [22] propose a framework in which the input parties
(the clients) delegate the computation to a set of untrusted workers. Relying on
multiple non-colluding servers requires a different business model for the ser-
vice provider of a privacy-preserving service. The service provider has to share
benefits with an almost equal peer offering its computational power [27]. We
therefore use a communication model consisting of clients (with private inputs)
and a server. In this model, the server provides no input to the computation and
does not learn the output, but makes its computational resources available to
the clients [24, 26]. Moreover, there are communication channels only between
each client and the server. Hence, it is a centralized communication pattern, i.e.,
a star network. As a result, the clients will only communicate with the server,
but never directly amongst each other. This model naturally fits with the client-
server architecture of Internet applications and allows a service provider to play
the server’s role. It can simplify the secure protocol, and improve its performance
and scalability [10,23,24].
Symbol Interpretation
µ Bitlength of inputs
n Number of clients
t Secret sharing threshold, t ≤ n
κ Bitlength of asymmetric ciphertext
λ Security parameter
x1, . . . , xn Client’s inputs
xbi = xiµ . . . xi1 Bit representation of xi with most significant bit (MSB) xiµ∣y∣ Bitlength of integer y, e.g., ∣xi∣ = µ⟦xi⟧ xi’s ciphertext under public key pk⟦xi⟧j xi’s ciphertext under public key pkj⟦xbi⟧ Bitwise encryption (⟦xiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧)
i
$← S Choose a random element i in set S{i1, . . . , it} $← S Choose t random distinct elements in S
Sn Set of all permutations of {1, . . . , n}
Table 1: Notations.
Kre-Ygc Kre-Ahe1 Kre-She [1]
Kre-Ahe2
# Rounds 4 4 2 O(µ)
Collusion-resis. n − 1 ∣ 0 t − 1 ∣ t t − 1 ∣ t t − 1 ∣ n/a
Fault-tolerance 0 n − t n − t n − t
Table 2: Schemes’ properties: The collusion row refers to the number of parties
that can collude - server excluded | server included - without breaking the privacy
of non-colluding clients. The fault-tolerance row refers to the number of parties
that can fail without preventing the protocol to properly compute the intended
functionality.
Kre-Ygc Kre-Ahe1 Kre-She [1]
sym. asym. Kre-Ahe2
CC-C O(nµ) O(n) O(nµ) O(µ) O(nµ2)
CC-S O(n2µ) O(n logn) O(n2µ) O(n2µ logµ) n/a
BC-C O(nµλ) O(nκ) O(nµκ) O((µ + n)κ) O(nµ2λ)
BC-S 0 O(n2κ) O(n2µκ) O(nκ) n/a
Table 3: Schemes’ Complexity: Rows CC-C/S and BC-C/S denote the compu-
tation and communication (bit) complexity for each client and the server, re-
spectively. The columns “sym.” and “asym.” denote symmetric and asymmetric
operations in Kre-Ygc.
Contribution. In summary, we propose different approaches for securely com-
puting the kth-ranked element (KRE) in a star network using either garbled
circuits (GC) or additive homomorphic encryption (AHE) or somewhat homo-
morphic encryption (SHE):
– Our first scheme Kre-Ygc uses Yao’s GC [3,32] to compare clients’ inputs.
– Our second scheme Kre-Ahe1 is based on threshold AHE. We first propose
a modified variant of the Lin-Tzeng comparison protocol [31]. The server then
uses it to compare inputs encrypted with AHE.
– In our third scheme Kre-Ahe2, we continue with threshold AHE, however,
we perform the comparison using the DGK protocol [14].
– The fourth scheme Kre-She is based on SHE and allows the server to non-
interactively compute the KRE such that the clients only interact to jointly
decrypt the result.
We compare the approaches in Tables 2 and 3 using the following measures:
– Number of rounds: In contrast to [1], all our protocols have a constant num-
ber of rounds.
– Collusion-resistance: This is a protocol property that is measured by the
number of parties that can collude without violating the privacy of the non-
colluding ones. In Kre-Ygc a collusion with the server completely breaks
the security, while Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 can tolerate the collusion of
several clients with the server as long as the number of colluding clients is
smaller than a threshold t. If the server does not collude, thenKre-Ygc can
tolerate up to n−1 colluding clients. Aggarwal et al.’s scheme [1] is collusion-
resistant if implemented with a threshold scheme.
– Fault-tolerance: It is a protocol property that is measured by the number of
parties that can fail without preventing the protocol to properly compute the
intended functionality. Our server model can only tolerate clients’ failure.
Kre-Ygc is not fault-tolerant while Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 can
tolerate failure of up to n − t clients. Aggarwal et al.’s scheme [1] is fault-
tolerant if implemented with a threshold scheme.
– Complexity: This refers to the asymptotic computation complexity as well
as the communication complexity. A summary is illustrated in Table 3. We
provide a detailed analysis in Appendix C.
Structure. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin by
presenting related work in Section 2 and some preliminaries in Section 3. We
present our security model in Section 4 and a technical overview in Section
5. The different approaches are presented in Sections 6 to 9. We discuss some
implementation details and evaluation results in Section 10, before concluding
our work in Section 11. We provide further details such as security proofs and
complexity analysis in the appendix.
2 Related Work
Our work is related to secure multiparty computation (SMC). There are sev-
eral generic SMC protocols [4, 13, 15, 25] that can be used to compute the kth-
ranked element of the union of n private datasets. In practice, specialized pro-
tocols offer better performance as they use domain knowledge of the required
functionality to optimize the secure protocol. Aggarwal et al. [2] introduced the
first specialized protocol for computing the kth-ranked element. Their multiparty
protocol performs a binary search in the input domain resulting in O(µ) compar-
isons and, hence, requiring O(µ) sequential rounds. Each round requires a secure
computation that performs two summations with complexity O(nµ) and two
comparisons with complexity O(µ). As a result each client requires O(nµ2 +µ2)
operations and sends O(nµ2 + µ2) bits. Our protocols perform O(n2) compar-
isons, that can be executed in parallel, and have a constant number of rounds.
A summary of the complexity of our schemes is illustrated in Table 3.
The server model for SMC was introduced in [17]. Kerschbaum [27] proposed
an approach allowing a service provider to offer a SMC service by himself. The
cryptographic study of the server model was initiated in [23,24]. They all provide
a generic solution for SMC while our approaches propose specialized protocol
for the kth-ranked element. The computation of the kth-ranked element is also
addressed in [5, 6] where the server is replaced by a blockchain. While the first
one [5] relies on Fischlin’s comparison protocol [18], the second one [6] relies
on the DGK comparison protocol [14]. The technical difficulty relies in the fact
that parties must prove correct execution of the protocol which is done using
zero-knowledge proofs resulting in maliciously secure protocols. These protocol
requires only 3 rounds of computation, however they leak the order of the inputs
to the parties.
3 Preliminaries
A Garbled Circuit (GC) [3, 16, 32, 38] can be used to execute any function pri-
vately between two parties. To evaluate a function f on input xi, xj , a garbling
scheme (F, e) ← Gb(1λ, s, f) takes a security parameter λ, a random seed s, a
Boolean encoding of f and outputs a garbled circuit F and an encoding string e
that is used to derive corresponding garbled inputs x¯i, x¯j from xi, xj , i.e. there
is a function En such that x¯i ← En(e, xi) and x¯j ← En(e, xj). The garbling
scheme is correct if F (x¯i, x¯j) = f(xi, xj).
A homomorphic encryption (HE) allows computations on ciphertexts by gen-
erating an encrypted result whose decryption matches the result of a function
on the plaintexts. A HE scheme consists of the following algorithms:
– pk, sk, ek ← KeyGen(λ): This probabilistic algorithm takes a security pa-
rameter λ and outputs public, private and evaluation key pk, sk and ek.
– c← Enc(pk,m): This probabilistic algorithm takes pk and a message m and
outputs a ciphertext c. We will denote Enc(pk,m) by ⟦m⟧ (see Table 1).
– c ← Eval(ek, f, c1, . . . , cn): This probabilistic algorithm takes ek, an n-ary
function f and n ciphertexts c1, . . . cn and outputs a ciphertext c.
– m′ ← Dec(sk, c): This deterministic algorithm takes sk and a ciphertext c
and outputs a message m′.
We require IND-CPA and the following correctness conditions ∀m1, . . . ,mn:
– Dec(sk,Enc(pk,mi)) =Dec(sk, ⟦mi⟧) =mi,
– Dec(sk,Eval(ek, f, ⟦m1⟧, . . . , ⟦mn⟧)) =Dec(sk, ⟦f(m1, . . . ,mn)⟧).
If the scheme supports only addition, then it is additively homomorphic. Schemes
such as [28,33] are additively homomorphic and have the following properties:
– Addition: ∀m1,m2, ⟦m1⟧ ⋅ ⟦m2⟧ = ⟦m1 +m2⟧,
– Multiplication with plaintext: ∀m1,m2, ⟦m1⟧m2 = ⟦m1 ⋅m2⟧,
– Xor: ∀a, b ∈ {0,1},Xor(⟦a⟧, b) = ⟦a⊕ b⟧ = ⟦1⟧b ⋅ ⟦a⟧(−1)b .
A Threshold Homomorphic Encryption (THE) [7,13] allows to share the private
key to the parties using a threshold secret sharing scheme such that a subset
of parties is required for decryption. Hence, instead of sk as above, the key
generation outputs a set of shares SK = {sks1, . . . , sksn} which are distributed
to the clients. The decryption algorithm is replaced by the following algorithms:
– m˜i ← Decp(sksi, c): The probabilistic partial decryption algorithm takes a
ciphertext c and a share sksi ∈ SK of the private key and outputs m˜i.
– m′ ←Decf(Mt): The deterministic final decryption algorithm takes a subset
Mt = {m˜j1 , . . . , m˜jt} ⊆ {m˜1, . . . , m˜n} of partial decryption shares and outputs
a message m′.
We refer to it as threshold decryption. It is correct if for all Mt = {m˜j1 , . . . , m˜jt}
such that ∣Mt∣ ≥ t and m˜ji =Decp(sksji , ⟦m⟧), it holds m =Decf(Mt).
When used in a protocol, we denote by combiner the party which is responsible to
execute algorithm Decf(). Depending on the protocol, the combiner can be any
party. It receives a set Mt = {m˜j1 , . . . , m˜jt} of ciphertexts, runs m′ ←Decf(Mt)
and publishes the result or move to the next step of the protocol specification.
4 Security Definition
This section provides definitions related to our model and security requirements.
We start by defining the kth-ranked element of a sequence of integers.
Definition 1. Let X = {x1, ..., xn} be a set of n distinct integers and x˜1, . . . , x˜n
be the corresponding sorted set, i.e., x˜1 ≤ . . . ≤ x˜n, and X = {x˜1, . . . , x˜n}. The
rank of an element xi ∈ X is j, such that xi = x˜j. The kth-ranked element (KRE)
is the element x˜k with rank k.
If the rank is k = ⌈n
2
⌉ then the element is called median. If k = 1 (resp. k = n)
then the element is called minimum (resp. maximum).
Definition 2. Let C1, . . . ,Cn be n clients each holding a private µ-bit integer
x1, . . . , xn and S be a server which has no input. Our ideal functionality FKRE
receives x1, . . . , xn from the clients, computes the KRE x˜k and outputs x˜k to
each client Ci. Moreover, FKRE outputs a leakage Li to each Ci and LS to S.
The leakage is specific to each protocol and contains information such as n, t, λ,
κ, µ (see Table 1). It can be inferred from the party’s view which is all that the
party is allowed to learn from the protocol execution. In case of limited collusion
(i.e., the number of colluding parties is smaller than a given threshold as given
in Table 2) additional leakage might include comparison results between some
pair of inputs or the rank of some inputs.
Definition 3. The view of the i-th party during an execution of the protocol on
input x⃗ = (x1, . . . , xn) is denoted by:
Viewi(x⃗) = {xi, ri,mi1,mi2, . . .},
where ri represents the outcome of the i-th party’s internal coin tosses, and mij
represents the j-th message it has received.
Since the server is a party without input, xi in its view will be replaced by the
empty string.
We say that two distributions D1 and D2 are computationally indistinguish-
able (denoted D1 c≡ D1) if no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm can distin-
guish them except with negligible probability.
In this paper, we assume that parties follow the protocol specification, but the
adversary keeps a record of all messages received by corrupted parties and tries to
infer as much information as possible. Our adversary is, therefore, semi-honest.
SMC security requires that what a party can learn from the protocol execution,
can be inferred from its input and output only. The protocol is said secure if
for each party, one can construct a simulator that given only the input and the
output can generate a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable to
the party’s view.
Definition 4. Let FKRE ∶ ({0,1}µ)n ↦ {0,1}µ be the functionality that takes n
µ-bit inputs x1, . . . , xn and returns their KRE. Let I = {i1, . . . , it} ⊂ {1, . . . , n+1}
be a subset of indexes of corrupted parties (Server’s input xn+1 is empty), x⃗ =(x1, . . . , xn) and
ViewI(x⃗) = (I,Viewi1(x⃗), . . . ,Viewit(x⃗)).
A protocol t-privately computes FKRE in the semi-honest model if there exists a
polynomial-time simulator SIM such that: ∀I, ∣I ∣ = t and LI = ⋃i∈I Li, it holds:
SIM(I, (xi1 , . . . , xit),FKRE(x1, . . . , xn),LI) c≡ ViewI(x1, . . . , xn).
5 Technical Overview
In an initialization phase, clients generate and exchange necessary cryptographic
keys through the server. We assume the existence of a trusted third party (e.g., a
certificate authority) which certifies public keys or generates keys for a threshold
cryptosystem. Moreover the trusted third party is not allowed to take part in
the main protocol or to collude with any party including the server. We stress
that the initialization phase is run once and its complexity does not depend on
the functionality that we want to compute. In the following, we therefore focus
on the actual computations.
We determine the KRE in the main protocol by computing the rank of each
xi and selecting the right one. To achieve that, we compare pairs of inputs(xi, xj),1 ≤ i, j,≤ n and denote the result by a comparison bit bij .
Definition 5. Let xi, xj ,1 ≤ i, j,≤ n, be integer inputs of Ci,Cj. Then the com-
parison bit bij of the pair (xi, xj) is defined as 1 if xi ≥ xj and 0 otherwise. The
computation of xi ≥ xj is distributed and involves Ci,Cj, where they play differ-
ent roles, e.g., generator and evaluator. Similar to the functional programming
notation of an ordered pair, we use head and tail to denote Ci and Cj.
For each input xi, we then add all bits bij ,1 ≤ j ≤ n to get its rank ri.
Lemma 1. Let x1, . . . , xn be n distinct integers, and let r1, . . . , rn ∈ {1, . . . , n}
be their corresponding ranks and bij the comparison bit for (xi, xj). It holds
ri = ∑nj=1 bij .
Proof. Since ri is the rank of xi, xi is by definition larger or equal to ri ele-
ments in {x1, . . . , xn}. This means that ri values among bi1, . . . , bin are 1 and
the remaining n − ri values are 0. It follows that ∑nj=1 bij = ri.
The above lemma requires distinct inputs. To make sure that clients’ inputs are
indeed distinct before the protocol execution, we borrow the idea of [2] and use
the index of parties as differentiator. Each party Ci represents its index i as a
logn-bit string and appends it at the end (i.e., in the least significant positions) of
the binary string of xi, resulting in a new input of length µ+logn. For simplicity,
we assume in the remainder of the paper, that the xi’s are all distinct µ-bit
integers. Therefore, it is not necessary to compare all pairs (xi, xj),1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
since we can deduce bji from bij .
As explained in Definition 5, Ci,Cj play different role in the comparison
for (xi, xj). Therefore, we would like to equally distribute the roles among the
clients. As example for n = 3, we need to compute only three (instead of nine)
comparisons resulting in three head roles and three tail roles. Then we would
like each of the three clients to play the role head as well as tail exactly one
time. We will use Definition 6 and Lemma 2 to equally distribute the roles head
and tail between clients.
Definition 6. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of n integers. We define the predicate
Paired as follows:
Paired(i, j) ∶= (i ≡ 1 (mod 2) ∧ i > j ∧ j ≡ 1 (mod 2)) ∨ (1a)(i ≡ 1 (mod 2) ∧ i < j ∧ j ≡ 0 (mod 2)) ∨ (1b)(i ≡ 0 (mod 2) ∧ i > j ∧ j ≡ 0 (mod 2)) ∨ (1c)(i ≡ 0 (mod 2) ∧ i < j ∧ j ≡ 1 (mod 2)). (1d)
Lemma 2. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of n integers and the predicate Paired
be as above. Then comparing only pairs (xi, xj) such that Paired(i, j) = true is
enough to compute the rank of all elements in X.
Proof. Let P = {(xi, xj) ∶ xi, xj ∈ X ∧ i ≠ j}, P1 = {(xi, xj) ∶ xi, xj ∈ X ∧
Paired(i, j) = true}, P2 = {(xi, xj) ∶ xi, xj ∈ X ∧Q(i, j) = true}, where Q(i, j) is
defined as follows:
Q(i, j) ∶= (i ≡ 1 (mod 2) ∧ i < j ∧ j ≡ 1 (mod 2)) ∨ (2a)(i ≡ 0 (mod 2) ∧ i > j ∧ j ≡ 1 (mod 2)) ∨ (2b)(i ≡ 0 (mod 2) ∧ i < j ∧ j ≡ 0 (mod 2)) ∨ (2c)(i ≡ 1 (mod 2) ∧ i > j ∧ j ≡ 0 (mod 2)). (2d)
Clearly, P contains the maximum number of comparisons required to compute
the rank of every xi ∈ X. Now it suffices to show that:
1. P1 and P2 form a partition of P
2. ∀ (xi, xj) ∈ P ∶ (xi, xj) ∈ P1⇔ (xj , xi) ∈ P2
P1 and P2 are clearly subsets of P. For each (xi, xj) ∈ P, (i, j) satisfies exactly
one of the conditions (1a), . . . , (1d), (2a), . . . , (2d), hence P ⊆ P1∪P2. Moreover,
for each (xi, xj) ∈ P, either Paired(i, j) = true or Q(i, j) = true. It follows that
P1 ∩P2 = ∅ which concludes the proof of claim 1. To prove claim 2, it suffices to
see that, (i, j) satisfies condition (1a) if and only if (j, i) satisfies condition (2a).
The same holds for (1b) and (2b), (1c) and (2c), (1d) and (2d).
For example, if n = 3, we compute comparison bits only for (x1, x2), (x2, x3),(x3, x1) and deduce the remaining comparison bits from the computed ones. If
n = 4, we compare only (x1, x2), (x1, x4), (x2, x3), (x3, x1), (x3, x4), (x4, x2).
The predicate Paired (Equation 1) is used in our schemes to reduce the num-
ber of comparisons and to equally distribute the computation task of the com-
parisons among the clients. Let #headi (resp. #taili) denote the number of
times Paired(i, j) = true (resp. Paired(j, i) = true) holds. For example, if
n = 3, we have #headi = #taili = 1 for all clients. However, for n = 4, we
have #head1 = #head3 = 2, #tail1 = #tail3 = 1, #head2 = #head4 = 1 and
#tail2 = #tail4 = 2.
Lemma 3. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of integers and assume the predicate
Paired is used to sort X. If n is odd then: #headi = #taili = n−12 . If n is even
then:
#headi = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
n
2
if i odd
n
2
− 1 if i even #taili =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
n
2
− 1 if i odd
n
2
if i even.
Proof. This is actually a corollary of the proof of Lemma 2. It follows from the
fact that (xi, xj) ∈ P1⇔ (xj , xi) ∈ P2 and any xi is involved in n−1 comparisons
(since we need bi1, . . . , bin to compute ri = ∑nj=1 bij , where we trivially have
bii = 1 without comparison). This proves the case when n is odd. If n is even
then the odd case applies for n′ = n − 1. Then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n′}, we have
Paired(i, n) = true if i is odd (condition 1b) and Paired(n, i) = true if i is even
(condition 1c).
6 Protocol Kre-Ygc
This section describes Kre-Ygc (Protocol 1) based on GC which consists of
an initialization and a main protocol. During initialization, parties generate and
distribute cryptographic keys. The online protocol uses GC to compare the in-
puts and AHE to compute the rank of each xi from the comparison bits. We
denote an AHE ciphertext with ⟦⋅⟧ (see Table 1).
6.1 Kre-Ygc Initialization
The initialization consists of public key distribution and Diffie-Hellman (DH)
key agreement. Each client Ci sends its public key pki (e.g., using a pseudonym
certificate) of an AHE to the server. The server then distributes the public keys
to the clients. In our implementation, we use the Paillier [33] scheme, but any
AHE scheme such as [28] will work as well. Then each pair (Ci,Cj) of clients runs
DH key exchange through the server to generate a common secret key ckij = ckji.
The common key ckij is used by Ci and Cj to seed the pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) of the garbling scheme that is used to generate a comparison
GC for xi and xj , i.e. Gb(1λ, ckij , f>), where f> is a Boolean comparison circuit.
6.2 Kre-Ygc Main Protocol
Protocol 1 is a four-round protocol in which we use GC to compare pairs of
inputs and to reveal a blinded comparison bit to the server. Then we use AHE to
unblind the comparison bits, compute the ranks and the KRE without revealing
anything to the parties. Let f> be defined as: f>((ai, xi), (aj , xj)) = ai⊕aj ⊕ bij ,
where ai, aj ∈ {0,1}, i.e., f> compares xi, xj and blinds the comparison bits bij
with ai, aj .
Comparing Inputs. For each pair (xi, xj), if Paired(i, j) = true the parties
do the following:
– Client Ci chooses a masking bit aiji
$← {0,1} and extends its input to (aiji , xi).
Then using the common key ckij , it computes (F ij> , e)← Gb(1λ, ckij , f>) and(a¯iji , x¯iji )← En(e, (aiji , xi)), and sends F ij> , (a¯iji , x¯iji ) to the server S.
– Client Cj chooses a masking bit aijj
$← {0,1} and extends its input xj to(aijj , xj). Then using the common key ckji = ckij , it computes (F ij> , e) ←
Gb(1λ, ckji, f>) and (a¯ijj , x¯ijj )← En(e, (aijj , xj)), and sends only (a¯ijj , x¯ijj ) to
the server S.
– We have b′ij ← F ij> ((a¯iji , x¯iji ), (a¯ijj , x¯ijj )) = aiji ⊕ ajij ⊕ bij (i.e. bij is hidden to
S). The server then evaluates all GCs (Steps 1 to 5).
Unblinding Comparison Bits. Using AHE, the parties unblind each b′ij =
aiji ⊕ajij ⊕ bij , where aiji is known to Ci and aijj is known to Cj , without learning
anything. As a result ⟦bij⟧i and ⟦bji⟧j are revealed to S encrypted under pki and
pkj . This is illustrated in Steps 6 to 16 and works as follows:
– S sends b′ij to Ci and Cj . They reply with ⟦ajij ⊕ bij⟧i and ⟦aiji ⊕ bij⟧j .
– S forwards ⟦aiji ⊕ bij⟧j , ⟦ajij ⊕ bij⟧i to Ci, Cj . They reply with ⟦bij⟧j , ⟦bij⟧i.
– S sets ⟦bji⟧j = ⟦1 − bij⟧j .
Computing the Rank. The computation of the rank is done at the server by
homomorphically adding comparison bits. Hence for each i, the server computes⟦ri⟧i = ⟦∑nj=1 bij⟧i. Then, it chooses a random number αi and computes ⟦βi⟧i =⟦(ri − k) ⋅αi⟧i (Steps 17 to 19). The ciphertext ⟦βi⟧i encrypts 0 if ri = k (i.e., xi
is the kth-ranked element) otherwise it encrypts a random plaintext.
Computing the KRE’s Ciphertext. Each client Ci receives ⟦βi⟧i encrypted
under its public key pki and decrypts it. Then if βi = 0, Ci sets mi = xi other-
wise mi = 0. Finally, Ci encrypts mi under each client’s public key and sends⟦mi⟧1, . . . , ⟦mi⟧n to the server (Steps 20 to 22).
Revealing the KRE’s Ciphertext. In the final steps (Steps 23 to 24), the
server adds all ⟦mj⟧i encrypted under pki and reveals ⟦∑nj=1mj⟧i to Ci.
Kre-Ygc protocol correctly computes the KRE. The proof trivially follows
from the correctness of the GC protocol, Lemmas 1 and 2 and the correctness of
the AHE scheme. Kre-Ygc is not fault-tolerant and a collusion with the server
reveals all inputs to the adversary.
7 Protocol Kre-Ahe1
This section describes Kre-Ahe1 (Protocol 4) based on threshold AHE. Kre-
Ahe1 compares all inputs (using our modified variant of the Lin-Tzeng protocol
[31]) at the server which then randomly distributes encrypted comparison bits
to the clients for threshold decryption.
Protocol 1: Kre-Ygc Protocol
1: for i ∶= 1, j ∶= i + 1 to n do
2: if Paired(i, j) then
3: Ci → S: F ij> , (a¯iji , x¯iji )
4: Cj → S: (a¯ijj , x¯ijj )
5: S: let b′ij ← F ij> (x¯iji , x¯ijj )
6: for i ∶= 1, j ∶= i + 1 to n do
7: if Paired(i, j) then
8: S → Ci: b′ij = aiji ⊕ ajij ⊕ bij
9: S → Cj : b′ij = aiji ⊕ ajij ⊕ bij
10: Ci → S: ⟦ajij ⊕ bij⟧i
11: Cj → S: ⟦aiji ⊕ bij⟧j
12: S → Ci: ⟦ajii ⊕ bij⟧j
13: S → Cj : ⟦aijj ⊕ bij⟧i
14: Ci → S: ⟦bij⟧j
15: Cj → S: ⟦bij⟧i
16: S: let ⟦bji⟧j ← ⟦1 − bij⟧j
17: for i ∶= 1 to n do
18: S ∶ ⟦ri⟧i ← ⟦∑nj=1 bij⟧i ▷ bii = 1
19: S → Ci: ⟦βi⟧i ← ⟦(ri − k) ⋅ αi⟧i, for a random αi
20: for i ∶= 1 to n do
21: Ci: mi ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩xi if βi = 00 if βi ≠ 0
22: Ci → S: ⟦mi⟧1, . . . , ⟦mi⟧n
23: for i ∶= 1 to n do
24: S → Ci: ⟦∑nj=1mj⟧i
7.1 Kre-Ahe1 Initialization
We assume threshold key generation. Hence, there is a public/private key pair(pk, sk) for an AHE, where the private key sk is split in n shares sks1, . . . , sksn
such that client Ci gets share sksi and at least t shares are required to recon-
struct sk. Additionally, each client Ci has its own AHE key pair (pki, ski) and
publishes pki to all clients. We denote by ⟦xi⟧, ⟦xi⟧j encryptions of xi under
pk, pkj respectively (Table 1).
7.2 Modified Lin-Tzeng Comparison Protocol
We first describe our modified version of the Lin-Tzeng comparison protocol [31].
The main idea of their construction is to reduce the greater-than comparison to
the set intersection problem of prefixes.
Input Encoding. Let Int(yη⋯y1) = y be a function that takes a bit string of
length η and parses it into the η−bit integer y = ∑ηl=1 yl ⋅ 2l−1. The 0-encoding
V 0xi and 1-encoding V
1
xi of an integer input xi are the following vectors: V
0
xi =(viµ,⋯, vi1), V 1xi = (uiµ,⋯, ui1), such that for each l, (1 ≤ l ≤ µ)
vil = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Int(xiµxiµ−1⋯xil′1) if xil = 0r(0)il if xil = 1
uil = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Int(xiµxiµ−1⋯xil) if xil = 1r(1)il if xil = 0,
where l′ = l + 1, r(0)il , r(1)il are random numbers of a fixed bitlength ν > µ (e.g.
2µ ≤ r(0)il , r(1)il < 2µ+1) with LSB(r(0)il ) = 0 and LSB(r(1)il ) = 1 (LSB is the least
significant bit). If the Int function is used the compute the element at position
l, then we call it a proper encoded element otherwise we call it a random encoded
element. Note that a random encoded element r(1)il at position l in the 1-encoding
of xi is chosen such that it is guaranteed to be different to a proper or random
encoded element at position l in the 0-encoding of xj , and vice versa. Hence,
it is enough if r(1)il and r(0)il are just one or two bits longer than any possible
proper encoded element at position l. Also note that the bitstring xiµxiµ−1⋯xil
is interpreted by the function Int as the bitstring yµ−l+1⋯y1 with length µ− l+1
where y1 = xil, y2 = xi(l+1), . . . , yµ−l+1 = xiµ. If we see V 0xi , V 1xj as sets, then xi > xj
iff they have exactly one common element.
Lemma 4. Let xi and xj be two integers, then xi > xj iff V = V 1xi − V 0xj has a
unique position with 0.
Proof. If V = V 1xi −V 0xj has a unique 0 at a position l, (1 ≤ l ≤ µ) then uil and vil
have bit representation yµ−l+1⋯y1, where for each h,µ−l+1 ≥ h ≥ 2, yh = xig = xjg
with g = l + h − 1, and y1 = xil = 1 and xjl = 0. It follows that xi > xj .
If xi > xj then there exists a position l such that for each h,µ ≥ h ≥ l+1, xih = xjh
and xil = 1 and xjl = 0. This implies uil = vil.
For h,µ ≥ h ≥ l + 1, either uih bit string is a prefix of xi while vjh is random,
or uih is random while vjh bit string is a prefix of xj . From the choice of r
(0)
ih ,
r
(1)
ih , we have uih ≠ vih.
For h, l − 1 ≥ h ≥ 1 there are three cases: uih and vih (as bit string) are both
prefixes of xi and xj , only one of them is prefix, both are random. For the first
case the difference of the bits at position l and for the other cases the choice of
r
(0)
ih imply that uih ≠ vih.
The Protocol. Let ⟦V 0xi⟧ = ⟦viµ⟧, . . . , ⟦vi1⟧ and ⟦V 1xi⟧ = ⟦uiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦ui1⟧ denote
the componentwise encryption of V 0xi and V
1
xi . Each client Ci sends ⟦V 0xi⟧, ⟦V 1xi⟧ to
the server. To determine the comparison bit for xi > xj , the server evaluates the
function LinCompare(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0xj⟧) (Algorithm 2) which returns µ ciphertexts
among which exactly one encrypts zero if an only if xi > xj .
Difference to the original protocol. In contrast to the original protocol of
[31], we note the following differences:
– Additively HE instead of multiplicative: It suits best with our setting and can
be implemented using ElGamal on elliptic curve with better performance and
smaller ciphertexts. While decrypting requires solving discrete logarithm,
this is however not necessary since we are looking for ciphertexts encrypting
0.
– Int function: Instead of relying on a collision-free hash function as [31], we
use the Int function which is simpler to implement and more efficient as it
produces smaller values.
– Choice of random encoded elements r(0)il , r(1)il : We choose the random en-
coded elements as explained above and encrypt them, while the original
protocol uses ciphertexts chosen randomly in the ciphertext space.
– Encrypting the encodings on both side: In the original protocol, the evaluator
has access to xj in plaintext and does not need to choose random encoded
elements. By encoding as explained in our modified version, we can encrypt
both encodings and delegate the evaluation to a third party which is not
allowed to have access to the inputs in plaintext.
7.3 Kre-Ahe1 Main Protocol
Protocol 4 is a four-round protocol in which the clients send their inputs en-
crypted using AHE under the common public key pk to the server. The server
homomorphically evaluates comparison circuits on the encrypted inputs using
our modified variant of the Lin-Tzeng protocol [31]. Then the clients jointly
decrypt the comparison results and compute the rank of each xi.
Uploading Ciphertexts. Using the common public key pk, each client Ci sends⟦xi⟧, ⟦V 0xi⟧, ⟦V 1xi⟧ to the server as illustrated in Step 2 of Protocol 4.
Algorithm2: Modified Lin-Tzeng Comparison Protocol
1: function LinCompare(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0xj ⟧)
2: parse ⟦V 1xi⟧ as ⟦uiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦ui1⟧
3: parse ⟦V 0xj ⟧ as ⟦viµ⟧, . . . , ⟦vi1⟧
4: for l ∶= 1 to µ do
5: cl = ⟦(uil − vjl) ⋅ rl⟧, for a random rl
6: choose permutation pi $← Sµ
7: return pi(cµ,⋯, c1)
Comparing Inputs. The server compares the inputs pairwise by computing
gij ← LinCompare(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0xj⟧) for each 1 ≤ i, j,≤ n. Let G be the n×n matrix[g11, . . . , g1n, . . . , gn1, . . . , gnn].
The server chooses n + 1 permutations pi,pi1, . . . , pin $← Sn that hide the indexes
of gij to the clients during threshold decryption: pi permutes the rows of G and
each pii,1 ≤ i ≤ n permutes the columns of row i. Let G′1, . . . ,G′n be the rows
of the resulting matrix G′ (after application of the permutations to G). Using
Algorithm 3, the server computes for each Ci a t×n matrix G(i) consisting of the
rows: G′i−t+1 mod n, . . . ,G′i−1 mod n,G′i. The matrix G(i) and the list of combiners
for rows in G(i) are sent to Ci in Step 11. An example is illustrated in Table 4.
Lemma 5 shows that the ciphertexts generated from Algorithm 3 allow to
correctly decrypt the matrix G = [g11, . . . , gnn], i.e., each gij is distributed to
exactly t different clients. By applying the lemma to the set of rows of G, the
first part shows that each client receives exactly a subset of t different rows of
G. The second part shows that each row of G is distributed to exactly t different
clients which allows a correct threshold decryption of each row.
Lemma 5. Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be a set of n elements, Xi = {xi−t+1, . . . , xi},
1 ≤ i ≤ n, where the indexes in Xi are computed modulo n, and t ≤ n. Then:
– Each subset Xi contains exactly t elements of X and
– Each x ∈ X is in exactly t subsets Xi.
Proof. It is clear from the definition that Xi ⊆ X for all i and since i−(i−t+1)+1 =
t, Xi has exactly t elements. Let xi be in X, then from the definition, xi is element
of only the subsets Xi,Xi+1, . . . ,Xi+t−1, where indexes of the Xi are computed
mod n. Again, it holds (i + t − 1) − i + 1 = t.
After receiving G(i), each client Ci performs its partial decryption for each
ciphertext, re-encrypts each line l (l ∈ I(i)) with the public key pkl of client
Cl. This prevents the server to learn comparison bits. Then Ci sends the result
h
(i)
l,j = ⟦Decp(sksi, glj)⟧l, (1 ≤ j ≤ n) to the server (Step 17). Client Cl will be
the combiner of the ciphertexts in line l. In Step 19, the server forwards the en-
crypted partial decryption results h(i1)lj , . . . , h(it)lj of line l and the corresponding
cl = ⟦xpi−1(l)⟧ to Cl. Client Cl decrypts and reconstructs each comparison result
resulting in the comparison bits bl1, . . . , bln as illustrated in Steps 24 and 25.
G G′ Decp Decf
g11, g12, g13 g32, g33, g31 C1, C2 C1
g21, g22, g23 g11, g13, g12 C2, C3 C2
g31, g32, g33 g23, g21, g22 C1, C3 C3
Table 4: Threshold Decryption Example (n = 3, t = 2): The elements of G are
permuted resulting in G′. Clients in columns “Decp” run Decp() on the corre-
sponding row and send the result to the client in column “Decf” for the final
decryption.
Algorithm3: Decryption Request in Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2
1: function DecReq(G, i, t, pi)
2: parse G as [g11, . . . , g1n, . . . , gn1, . . .]
3: let G(i) = [q(i)11 , . . . , q(i)1n , . . . , q(i)t1 , . . .]
4: for u ∶= 1 to t do
5: j ← i − t + u mod n
6: if j ≤ 0 then
7: j ← j + n ▷ 1 ≤ j ≤ n
8: I(i) ← I(i) ∪ {j}
9: w ← pi(j)
10: for v ∶= 1 to n do
11: q(i)uv ← g′wv
12: return (G(i), I(i))
Computing the KRE’s Ciphertext. Each combiner Cl computes the rank
rl = ∑nj=1 blj (Step 27) and ciphertext c˜l that is either a re-encryption of cl if
rl = k or an encryption of 0 otherwise (Step 28). The ciphertext c˜l is sent back
to the server. The server multiplies all c˜l (Step 29) resulting in a ciphertext c˜ of
the KRE which is sent to a subset It of t clients for threshold decryption (Step
32). Each client in It performs a partial decryption (Step 34), encrypts the result
for all clients and sends the ciphertexts to the server (Step 35). Finally, the sever
forwards the encrypted partial decryption to the clients (Step 37) that they use
to learn the KRE (Step 38).
Kre-Ahe1 protocol correctly computes the KRE. The proof trivially follows
from the correctness of the Lin-Tzeng comparison protocol [31], Lemmas 1 and
5 and the correctness of AHE. Kre-Ahe1 executes all O(n2) comparisons non-
interactively at the server, but requires threshold decryption for O(n2) elements.
The next protocol runs the O(n2) comparisons in parallel with the help of the
clients while requiring threshold decryption of only O(n) elements.
8 Protocol Kre-Ahe2
In this section, we describe Kre-Ahe2 (Protocol 7) which instantiates the com-
parison with the DGK protocol [14]. The initialization is similar to the previous
case. We start by briefly reviewing the DGK protocol [14].
Protocol 4: Kre-Ahe1 Protocol
1: for i ∶= 1 to n do
2: Ci → S: ⟦xi⟧, ⟦V 0xi⟧, ⟦V 1xi⟧
3: for i, j ∶= 1 to n (i ≠ j) do
4: S: gij ← LinCompare(⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0xj ⟧)
5: S ∶ let permutations pi0, . . . , pit $← Sn
6: S ∶ let G = [g11, . . . , gnn]
7: S ∶ (c1 . . . , cn)← pi0(⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xn⟧)
8: for u, v ∶= 1 to n do
9: S ∶ guv ← gpi0(u)piu(v)
10: for i ∶= 1 to n do
11: S → Ci: Q(i) ←DecReq(G, i, t, pi0)
12: Ci: parse Q(i) as (G(i), I(i))
parse G(i) as [q(i)u11, . . . . . . , q(i)utn]
parse I(i) as [I(i)1 , . . . , I(i)t ]
13: for i ∶= 1 to n do
14: for u ∶= 1 to t do
15: for v ∶= 1 to n do
16: for each l ∈ I(i)u do
17: Ci → S: h(i)uv ← ⟦Decp(sksi, q(i)uv )⟧l
18: let {l1, . . . , lt} be the indexes of partial decryptors of the l-th row of G
19: for l ∶= 1 to n do
20: S → Cl: cl
21: for j ∶= 1 to n do
22: S → Cl: h(l1)lj , . . . , h(lt)lj
23: for l, j ∶= 1 to n do
24: Cl: du =Dec(skl, h(lu)lj ), u = 1 . . . t
25: Cl: blj ←Decf(d1, . . . , dt)
26: for l ∶= 1 to n do
27: Cl: rl ← ∑nj=1 blj
28: Cl → S: c˜l ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩cl ⋅ ⟦0⟧ if rl = k⟦0⟧ if rl ≠ k
29: S: let c˜←∏nl=1 c˜l
30: S: let It = {i1, . . . , it} $← {1, . . . , n}
31: for all i ∈ It do
32: S → Ci: c˜
33: for all i ∈ It do
34: Ci: m(i) =Decp(sksi, c˜)
35: Ci → S: ⟦m(i)⟧1, . . . , ⟦m(i)⟧n
36: for i ∶= 1 to n do
37: S → Ci: ⟦m(i1)⟧i, . . . , ⟦m(it)⟧i
38: Ci: Decf(m(i1), . . . ,m(it))
Algorithm5: Algorithms of the DGK Comparison Protocol
1: function DgkCompare(i, j)
2: if Paired(i, j) then
3: S → Cj : ⟦xbi⟧i = ⟦xiµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧i
4: Cj : (δji, Z)←DgkEval(⟦xbi⟧i, xbj)
5: Cj : parse Z as (⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i)
6: Cj → S: ⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i, ⟦δji⟧
7: S → Ci: ⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i, ⟦δji⟧
8: Ci: δij ←DgkDec(⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i)
9: Ci → S: ⟦δij ⊕ δji⟧
10: S ∶ return ⟦bij⟧ = ⟦δij ⊕ δji⟧
1: function DgkEval(⟦xbi⟧, xbj)
2: parse ⟦xbi⟧ as ⟦xiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧
3: parse xbj as xjµ . . . xj1
4: for u ∶= 1 to µ do
5: compute ⟦xiu ⊕ xju⟧
6: δji
$← {0,1}, s← 1 − 2 ⋅ δji
7: for u ∶= 1 to µ do
8: ⟦zu⟧← (∏µv=u+1⟦xiv ⊕ xjv⟧)3
9: ⟦zu⟧← ⟦zu⟧⟦s⟧⟦xiu⟧⟦xju⟧−1
10: ⟦zu⟧← ⟦zu⟧ru , for a random ru
11: choose permutation pi $← Sµ
12: return (δji, pi(⟦zµ⟧, . . . , ⟦z1⟧))
1: function DgkDec(⟦zµ⟧, . . . , ⟦z1⟧)
2: for u ∶= 1 to µ do
3: if Dec(ski, ⟦zu⟧) = 0 then
4: return 1
5: return 0
8.1 DGK Comparison Protocol
Let (pki, ski) be the public/private key pair of Ci. Client Ci will be called Gen-
erator and Cj Evaluator. Privately evaluating xi ≥ xj works as follows:
– Ci sends ⟦xiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧ to party Cj
– Cj computes (δji, ⟦zµ⟧, . . . , ⟦z1⟧) ← DgkEval(⟦xbi⟧, xbj) (Algorithm 5) and
sends (⟦zµ⟧, . . . , ⟦z1⟧) to Ci and outputs δji
– Ci computes δij ←DgkDec(⟦zµ⟧, . . . , ⟦z1⟧) (Algorithm 5) and outputs δij .
The comparison with the server is illustrated in Algorithm 5. For each pair Ci,Cj
such that Paired(i, j) holds, the clients Ci and Cj run the DGK protocol with
the server. The server forwards ⟦xbi⟧i = ⟦xiµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧i (encrypted under pki)
to Cj . Client Cj runs DgkEval(⟦xbi⟧i, xbj) and obtains δji, (⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i)
as result. It then encrypts δji under the common public key and sends back⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i, ⟦δji⟧ to client Ci via the server. Client Ci runs the decryption
DgkDec(⟦ziµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦zi1⟧i), obtains a shared bit δij and sends back ⟦δij ⊕ δji⟧
to the server. After the computation the clients Ci and Cj hold random shared
bits δij and δji such that bij = [xi ≤ xj] = δij ⊕ δji holds. The server learns the
encryption ⟦bij⟧ of the comparison bit bij . In the DGK protocol clients Ci and
Cj perform respectively O(µ) and O(6µ) asymmetric operations.
8.2 Kre-Ahe2 Main Protocol
Kre-Ahe2 is a 4-round protocol in which inputs are compared interactively
using the DGK protocol. The resulting comparison bit is encrypted under pk
and revealed to the server which then computes the ranks of the xi’s and trigger
a threshold decryption.
Uploading Ciphertext. Each party Ci sends ⟦x⟧ (encrypted under the common
public key pk) and ⟦xbi⟧i = (⟦xiµ⟧i, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧i) (encrypted under its own public
key pki) to the server. This is illustrated in Step 2 of protocol 7. The server
then initializes a matrix G = [g11, . . . , gnn], where gii = ⟦1⟧ and gij(i ≠ j) will
be computed in the DGK protocol as gij = ⟦bij⟧ if Paired(i, j) is true, and an
array X = [⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xn⟧] (Step 3).
Comparing Inputs. In this step, pairs of clients run DgkCompare with the
server as illustrated in Algorithm 5. If (i, j) satisfies the predicate Paired, then
Ci runs the DGK protocol as generator and Cj is the evaluator. After the compu-
tation, Ci and Cj get shares δij and δji of the comparison bit which is encrypted
under pk as ⟦bij⟧ = ⟦δij ⊕ δji⟧ and revealed to the server.
Computing the KRE’s Ciphertext. After all admissible comparisons have
been computed (and the result stored in the matrix G), the server uses Algo-
rithm 6 to compute the rank of each input xi by homomorphically adding the
comparison bits involving xi. Let ⟦ri⟧ be a ciphertext initially encrypting 0 and
let bij = δij⊕δji. For each j, if Paired(i, j) is true (i.e., ⟦bij⟧ has been computed)
then we compute ⟦ri⟧← ⟦ri + bij⟧. Otherwise (i.e., ⟦bij⟧ has not been computed
but we can deduce it from ⟦bji⟧) we compute ⟦ri⟧ ← ⟦ri + 1 − bij⟧. Now, the
server has the encrypted rank ⟦r1⟧, . . . , ⟦rn⟧, where exactly one ⟦ri⟧ encrypts k.
Since we are looking for the element whose rank is k, the server then computes
yi = (⟦ri⟧ ⋅ ⟦k⟧−1)αi ⋅ ⟦xi⟧ = ⟦(ri −k)αi +xi⟧ for all i, where αi is a number chosen
randomly in the plaintext space. Therefore, for the ciphertext ⟦ri⟧ encrypting k,
yi is equal to ⟦xi⟧. Otherwise yi encrypts a random plaintext.
Decrypting the KRE’s Ciphertext. In Step 12, the server distributes the
result Y = [y1, . . . , yn] of Algorithm 6 to the clients for threshold decryption.
For that, the array Y is passed as n × 1 matrix to Algorithm 3. In Step 16, the
server receives partial decryption results from the clients, forwards them to the
corresponding combiner (Step 18). Each combiner Cj performs a final decryption
(Step 21) resulting in a message x˜j whose bitlength is less or equal to µ if it is
the KRE. Combiner Cj then sets m(j) = x˜j if ∣x˜j ∣ ≤ µ, otherwise m(j) = 0 (Step
22). Then m(j) is encrypted with the public key of all clients and send to the
server (Step 23). Finally, the server reveals the KRE to all clients (Step 25).
Algorithm6: Computing the KRE’s ciphertext in Kre-Ahe2
1: function ComputeKreAhe(G,X,k)
2: parse G as [g11, . . . , gnn]
3: parse X as [⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xn⟧]
4: for i ∶= 1 to n do
5: ⟦ri⟧← gii
6: for j ∶= 1 to n (j ≠ i) do
7: if Paired(i, j) then
8: ⟦ri⟧← ⟦ri⟧ ⋅ gij
9: else
10: ⟦ri⟧← ⟦ri⟧ ⋅ ⟦1⟧ ⋅ g−1ji
11: for i ∶= 1 to n do
12: yi ← (⟦ri⟧ ⋅ ⟦k⟧−1)αi ⋅ ⟦xi⟧
13: return [y1, . . . , yn]
Kre-Ahe2 protocol correctly computes the KRE. This trivially follows from
the correctness of DGK protocol [14], Lemmas 1 and 5 and the correctness
of AHE. Kre-Ahe2 evaluates comparisons interactively but requires threshold
decryption for O(n) elements. Notice that Kre-Ahe2 can be instantiated with
the Lin-Tzeng protocol [31] as well. To compare xi, xj , Cj will receive both⟦V 0xi⟧, ⟦V 1xi⟧ and randomly choose between evaluating LinCompare either with⟦V 1xi⟧, ⟦V 0xj⟧ or with ⟦V 1xj⟧, ⟦V 0xi⟧. It will then set δji ← 0 or δji ← 1 accordingly.
This improves the running time (LinCompare is more efficient than DgkEval)
while increasing the communication (µ more ciphertexts are sent to Cj).
In Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2, we evaluated either the comparison (Kre-
Ahe1) or the rank (Kre-Ahe2) completely at the server. In the next scheme, we
compute the KRE’s ciphertext non-interactively at the server such that clients
are only required for the threshold decryption of one ciphertext.
9 Protocol Kre-She
This section describes Kre-She based on SHE. Hence, ⟦x⟧ now represents an
SHE ciphertext of the plaintext x. The initialization and threshold decryption
are similar to Kre-Ahe1.
9.1 SHE Routines
Protocol 9 is based on the BGV scheme [9] as implemented in HElib [20] and re-
quires binary plaintext space and Smart-Vercauteren ciphertext packing (SVCP)
technique [36].
Using SVCP, a ciphertext consists of a fixed number m of slots encrypting
bits, i.e. ⟦⋅∣ ⋅ ∣ . . . ∣⋅⟧. The encryption of a bit b replicates b to all slots, i.e., ⟦b⟧ =⟦b∣b∣ . . . ∣b⟧. However, we can pack the bits of xbi in one ciphertext and will denote
it by ⟦x⃗i⟧ = ⟦xiµ∣ . . . ∣xi1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧.
Protocol 7: Kre-Ahe2 Protocol
1: for i ∶= 1 to n do
2: Ci → S: ⟦xi⟧, ⟦xbi⟧i
3: S ∶ let G = [g11, . . . , gnn]
S ∶ let X = [⟦x1⟧, . . . , ⟦xn⟧]
4: for i ∶= 1, j ∶= i + 1 to n do
5: Ci,Cj , S: gij ←DgkCompare(i, j)
6: S: Y ← ComputeKreAhe(G,X,k)
7: S: let pi $← Sn be a permutation
8: S: parse Y as [y1, . . . , yn]
9: for i ∶= 1 to n do
10: S: yi ← ypi(i)
11: for i ∶= 1 to n do
12: S → Ci: Q(i) ←DecReq(Y, i, t, pi)
13: Ci: parse Q(i) as (Z(i), I(i))
parse Z(i) as [z(i)j1 , . . . , z(i)jt ]
14: for i ∶= 1 to n do
15: for each j in I(i) do
16: Ci → S: h(i)j ← ⟦Decp(sksi, z(i)j )⟧j
17: for j ∶= 1 to n do
18: S → Cj : (h(i1)j , . . . , h(it)j )
19: for j ∶= 1 to n do
20: Cj : du =Dec(skj , h(iu)j ), u = 1, . . . , t
21: Cj : x˜j ←Decf(d1, . . . , dt)
22: Cj : m(j) ∶= ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩x˜j if ∣x˜j′ ∣ ≤ µ0 if ∣x˜j′ ∣ > µ
23: Cj → S: ⟦m(j)⟧1, . . . , ⟦m(j)⟧n
24: for i ∶= 1 to n do
25: S → Ci: ⟦∑nj=1m(j)⟧i
26: Ci: Dec(ski, ⟦∑nj=1m(j)⟧i)
Each Ci sends ⟦xbi⟧, ⟦x⃗i⟧ to S as input to Algorithm 8 which uses built-in
routines to compute the KRE.
The routine SheAdd takes two or more ciphertexts and performs a component-
wise addition mod 2, i.e., we have:
SheAdd(⟦bi1∣ . . . ∣bim⟧, ⟦bj1∣ . . . ∣bjm⟧) = ⟦bi1 ⊕ bj1∣ . . . ∣bim ⊕ bjm⟧.
Similarly, for component-wise multiplication routine we have:
SheMult(⟦bi1∣ . . . ∣bim⟧, ⟦bj1∣ . . . ∣bjm⟧) = ⟦bi1 ⋅ bj1∣ . . . ∣bim ⋅ bjm⟧.
Let xi, xj be two integers, bij = [xi > xj] and bji = [xj > xi], the routine
SheCmp takes ⟦xbi⟧, ⟦xbj⟧, compares xi and xj and returns ⟦bij⟧, ⟦bji⟧. Note that
if the inputs to SheCmp encrypt the same value, then the routine outputs two
ciphertexts of 0.
Let bi1, . . . , bin be n bits such that ri = ∑nj=1 bij and let rbi = ri logn, . . . , ri1 be
the bit representation of ri. The routine SheFadder implements a full adder
on ⟦bi1⟧, . . . , ⟦bin⟧ and returns ⟦rbi ⟧ = (⟦ri logn⟧, . . . , ⟦ri1⟧).
There is no built-in routine for equality check in HElib. We implemented it
using SheCmp and SheAdd. Let xi and xj be two µ-bit integers. We use SheE-
qual to denote the equality check routine and implement SheEqual(⟦xbi ⟧, ⟦xbj⟧)
by computing:
– (⟦b′i⟧, ⟦b′′i ⟧) = SheCmp(⟦xbi ⟧, ⟦xbj⟧) and
– ⟦βi⟧ = SheAdd(⟦b′i⟧, ⟦b′′i ⟧, ⟦1⟧), which results in βi = 1 if xi = xj and βi = 0
otherwise.
9.2 Kre-She Main Protocol
In Protocol 9 the server S receives encrypted inputs from clients. For each client’s
integer xi, the encrypted input consists of:
– an encryption ⟦xbi ⟧ = (⟦xiµ⟧, . . . , ⟦xi1⟧) of the bit representation and
– an encryption ⟦x⃗i⟧ = ⟦xiµ∣ . . . ∣xi1∣0∣ . . . ∣0⟧ of the packed bit representation .
Then the server runs Algorithm 8 which uses SheCmp to pairwise compare
the inputs resulting in encrypted comparison bits ⟦bij⟧. Then SheFadder is
used to compute the rank of each input by adding comparison bits. The result
is an encrypted bit representation ⟦rbi ⟧ of the ranks. Using the encrypted bit
representations ⟦kb⟧, ⟦rbi ⟧ of k and each rank, SheEqual checks the equality
and returns an encrypted bit ⟦βi⟧. Recall that because of SVCP the encryption of
a bit βi is automatically replicated in all slots, i.e., ⟦βi⟧ = ⟦βi∣βi∣ . . . ∣βi⟧, such that
evaluating ⟦y⃗i⟧ ← SheMult(⟦x⃗i⟧, ⟦βi⟧), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and SheAdd(⟦y⃗1⟧, . . . , ⟦y⃗n⟧)
returns the KRE’s ciphertext. Recall that because of SVCP the encryption of a
bit βi is automatically replicated in all slots, i.e., ⟦βi⟧ = ⟦βi∣βi∣ . . . ∣βi⟧, such that
evaluating ⟦y⃗i⟧ ← SheMult(⟦x⃗i⟧, ⟦βi⟧), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and SheAdd(⟦y⃗1⟧, . . . , ⟦y⃗n⟧)
returns the KRE’s ciphertext.
Correctness and security follow trivially from Lemma 1, correctness and se-
curity of SHE. The leakage is LS = Li = {n, t, κ, λ, µ}.
10 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss some implementation details and evaluate and compare
our schemes.
10.1 Implementation Details
We implemented our schemes using software libraries SCAPI [16,34] and HElib
[20,21] which we briefly describe here.
Algorithm8: Computing the KRE’s Ciphertext in Kre-She
1: function ComputeKreShe(X,Z, c)
2: parse X as [⟦xb1⟧, . . . , ⟦xbn⟧]
parse Z as [⟦x⃗1⟧, . . . , ⟦x⃗n⟧]
parse c as ⟦kb⟧
3: for i ∶= 1 to n do
4: ⟦bii⟧← ⟦1⟧
5: for j ∶= i + 1 to n do
6: (⟦bij⟧, ⟦bji⟧)← SheCmp(⟦xbi⟧, ⟦xbj⟧)
7: for i ∶= 1 to n do
8: ⟦rbi ⟧← SheFadder(⟦bi1⟧, . . . , ⟦bin⟧)
9: for i ∶= 1 to n do
10: ⟦βi⟧← SheEqual(⟦rbi ⟧, ⟦kb⟧)
11: for i ∶= 1 to n do
12: ⟦y⃗i⟧← SheMult(⟦x⃗i⟧, ⟦βi⟧)
13: return SheAdd(⟦y⃗1⟧, . . . , ⟦y⃗n⟧)
Protocol 9: Kre-She Protocol
1: for i ∶= 1 to n do
2: Ci → S: ⟦xbi⟧, ⟦x⃗i⟧
3: S ∶ let X = [⟦xb1⟧, . . . , ⟦xbn⟧]
let Z = [⟦x⃗1⟧, . . . , ⟦x⃗n⟧]
let c = ⟦kb⟧
4: S ∶ c′ ← ComputeKreShe(X,Z, c)
parse c′ as ⟦xi∗⟧
5: S: let It = {i1, . . . , it} $← {1, . . . , n}
6: for all i ∈ It do
7: S → Ci: ⟦xi∗⟧
8: for all i ∈ It do
9: Ci: m(i) ←Decp(sksi, ⟦xi∗⟧)
10: Ci → S: ⟦m(i)⟧1, . . . , ⟦m(i)⟧n
11: for i ∶= 1 to n do
12: S → Ci: ⟦m(i1)⟧i, . . . , ⟦m(it)⟧i
13: Ci: Decf(m(i1), . . . ,m(it))
SCAPI We implemented Kre-Ygc, Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2 as client-server
Java applications while using SCAPI [16]. SCAPI is an open-source Java library
for implementing SMC protocols. It provides a reliable, efficient, and highly
flexible cryptographic infrastructure. It also provides a GC framework includ-
ing several optimizations such as OT extensions, free-XOR, garbled row reduc-
tion [16]. This GC framework has been used to run GC comparison circuits in
Kre-Ygc. Furthermore, there is a built-in communication layer that provides
communication services for any interactive cryptographic protocol.
HElib As Kre-She mostly consists of the homomorphic evaluation by the
server, we implemented Algorithm 8 using HElib [20]. HElib is a software li-
brary that implements homomorphic encryption. The current version of the li-
brary includes an implementation of the BGV lattice-based homomorphic en-
cryption scheme [9] . It also includes various optimizations that make homomor-
phic encryption runs faster, including the Smart-Vercauteren ciphertext packing
(SVCP) techniques [36]. We also implemented the threshold decryption for a
n-out-of-n secret sharing of BGV’s private key.
10.2 Experiments
In this section, we report on the experimental results of our implementations.
We start by describing the experimental setup.
Experimental Setup. For Kre-Ygc, Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2, we conducted ex-
periments using for the server a machine with a 6-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) E-
2176M CPU @ 2.70GHz and 32GB of RAM, and for the clients two machines
with each two Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E7-4880 v2 @ 2.50GHz. The client ma-
chines were equipped with 8GB and 4 GB of RAM, and were connected to the
server via WAN. Windows 10 Enterprise was installed on all three machines..
Windows 10 Enterprise was installed on all three machines. For each experiment,
about 3/5 of the clients were run on the machine with 8 GB RAM while about
2/5 were run on the machine with 4 GB RAM. We ran all experiments using
JRE version 8.
Since the main computation of Kre-She is done on the server, we focus on
evaluation Algorithm 8 on a Laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7300U CPU @
2.60GHz running 16.04.1-Ubuntu with 4.10.0-14-lowlatency Kernel version.
Results. We evaluated Kre-Ygc, Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2 at security level λ =
128, bitlength µ = 32 and (minimal) threshold t = 2 for threshold decryption.
We instantiated Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 with Elliptic Curve ElGamal (see
Appendix A) using elliptic curve secp256r1. Figure 8 shows our performance
results which are summarized in Table 5 for n = 100 clients. In Table 5, we also
illustrate the costs when t = 1 (i.e., each Ci knows sk) for both Kre-Ahe2 and
Kre-Ahe1 and when t = n (i.e. all Ci must participate in the threshold decryp-
tion) for Kre-Ahe2.
Kre-Ygc is the most efficient in both computation and communication and
takes 197 seconds to each client to compute the KRE of 100 clients in a WAN
setting. The communication is 0.31 MB for each client and 5.42 MB for the
server. However, Kre-Ygc is neither collusion-resistant nor fault-tolerant.
Kre-Ahe2 is the second most efficient and is collusion-resistant and fault-
tolerant. Although it requires more interactions to compute comparisons, we
batched many comparisons together and were able to run threshold decryption
for O(n) elements, instead of O(n2) as in Kre-Ahe1. The computation of the
KRE of 100 values takes to each client 353 seconds (for t = 1), 336 seconds (for
t = 2) and 441 seconds (for t = 100). The communication is 0.3 MB, 0.3 MB,
(a) Computation Cost Kre-Ygc (b) Computation Cost Kre-Ahe1
(c) Computation Cost Kre-Ahe2 (d) Communication Cost in MB
Fig. 10: Results for Kre-Ygc, Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2
(a) Server Computation Cost (b) Threshold Decryption Cost
Fig. 11: Performance Results Kre-She
Kre-Ygc Kre-Ahe2 Kre-Ahe1
t n/a 1 2 100 1 2
Time (s) 197.00 353.00 336.00 441.00 1024.00 1749.00
C-Bits (MB) 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.56 1.11
S-Bits (MB) 5.42 56.07 56.12 60.56 111.37 222.67
Table 5: Performance Comparison for 100 clients: C-Bits (resp. S-Bits) denotes the number of bits
sent by each client (resp. the server). t is the secret sharing threshold, i.e., the number of clients
that must contribute to the treshold decryption.
0.32 MB for each client and 56.07 MB, 56.12 MB, 60.56 MB for the server when
t = 1,2,100, respectively.
While being collusion-resistant and fault-tolerant as well, Kre-Ahe1 is less
efficient than Kre-Ygc and Kre-Ahe2. The computation of the KRE of 100
values takes to each client 1024 seconds (for t = 1), 1749 seconds (for t = 2).
The communication is 0.56 MB, 1.11 MB for each client and 111.37 MB, 222.67
MB for the server when t = 1,2, respectively. For t = 100, our testbed ran out of
memory.
We evaluated Algorithm 8 of Kre-She at security level at least 110. The
result is illustrated in Figure 11a for inputs with bitlength µ = 16. The com-
putation is dominated by the inputs’ comparison and takes less than one hour
for 25 clients. We also evaluated in Figure 11b the performance of the threshold
decryption with a n-out-of-n secret sharing. For up to 40 clients threshold de-
cryption costs less than 0.15 second. Kre-She is practically less efficient than
all other schemes, but has the best asymptotic complexity.
As a resultKre-Ygc is suitable for a setting where the server is non-colluding
and clients cannot fail. If collusion and failure are an issue, then either Kre-
Ahe1 or Kre-Ahe2 or even Kre-She is suitable. Kre-Ahe1 can be more
time efficient than Kre-Ahe2 for up to 30 clients and a highly parallelizable
server. Kre-She has the best asymptotic complexity, however, it requires more
efficient somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes.
11 Conclusion
In this paper we considered the problem of computing the KRE (with applica-
tions to benchmarking) of n clients’ private inputs using a server. The general
idea of our solution is to sort the inputs, compute the rank of each input, use
it to compute the KRE. The computation is supported by the server which co-
ordinates the protocol and undertakes as much computations as possible. We
proposed and compare different approaches based on garbled circuits or thresh-
old HE. The server is oblivious, and does not learn the input of the clients. We
also implemented and evaluated our schemes. As a result Kre-Ygc is suitable
for a setting where the server is non-colluding and clients cannot fail. If collu-
sion and failure are an issue, then either Kre-Ahe2 or Kre-She is suitable.
Kre-She has the best asymptotic complexity, however, it requires more efficient
somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes.
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A ElGamal Encryption
The threshold decryption in Kre-Ahe1, Kre-Ahe2 has be implemented using
elliptic curve ElGamal (ECE) [28]. We briefly present ECE and its threshold
decryption [8].
Let G be an elliptic curve group generated by a point P of prime order p.
The key generation chooses s
$← Zp and outputs sk = s and pk = s ⋅ P as private
and public key. To encrypt an integer m, one chooses r
$← Zp and outputs the
ciphertext c = (r ⋅ P,m ⋅ P + r ⋅ pk). To decrypt a ciphertext c = (α1, α2), one
computes Q = α2 − α1 ⋅ sk and solves the discrete logarithm on G.
Let n, t be integers such that t ≤ n. To support t-out-of-n threshold decryption
the secret key sk = s is secret-shared using Shamir secret sharing scheme [35] by
choosing a random polynomial: f(x) = s+∑t−1i=1 aixi and computing secret shares
si = f(i),1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let Li(x) and li be defined as: Li(x) = ∏tj=1,j≠i x−ji−j and li =
Li(0) = ∏tj=1,j≠i −ji−j . Given t shares (1, s1), . . . , (t, st), the polynomial g(x) =∑ti=1Li(x) ⋅ si is the same as f(x) since both have degree at most t − 1 and
match at t points. Therefore s = f(0) = g(0) = ∑ti=1 si ⋅ li. The numbers li are
called Lagrange coefficients. The threshold key generation outputs secret key
shares sksi = (si, li),1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let It ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a subset of t clients and
assume for simplicity It = {1, . . . , t}. To decrypt a ciphertext c = (α1, α2) each
client Ci, i ∈ It computes mi = α1 ⋅ si ⋅ li. Then the combiner receives all mi,
computes α2 − ∑ti=1mi = α2 − α1 ⋅ ∑ti=1 si ⋅ li = α2 − α1 ⋅ s = Q and solve the
discrete logarithm on G. This requires O(1) to each client Ci, i ∈ It and O(log t)
asymmetric operations to the combiner.
B Security Proofs
Let the inherent leakage be L = {k,n, t, κ, λ, µ}, i.e., protocol’s parameters.
Theorem 1. If the server S is non-colluding and the AHE scheme is IND-CPA
secure, then Kre-Ygc 1-privately computes FKRE in the semi-honest model with
leakage LS = Li = L. Hence, there are simulators SIMCi for each Ci and SIMS
for S such that:
SIMS(∅,LS) c≡ ViewS(x1, . . . , xn) and
SIMCi(xi,FKRE(x1, . . . , xn),Li) c≡ ViewCi(x1, . . . , xn).
Proof (Proof (Sketch)). The leakage is clear as parties see only random strings.
ViewCi consists of:
(F ij> , (b¯iji , x¯iji ), b′ij , ⟦bjij ⊕ bij⟧i, ⟦bjii ⊕ bij⟧j , ⟦bij⟧j)1≤j≤n(i≠j), ⟦βi⟧i, βi.
For each m ∈ ViewCi , SIMCi chooses random bit strings of length ∣m∣. The view
of the server consists of:
⟨F ij> , (b¯iji , x¯iji ), (b¯ijj , x¯ijj ), b′ij , ⟦bjij ⊕ bij⟧i, ⟦bjii ⊕ bij⟧j , ⟦biji ⊕ bij⟧j , ⟦bijj ⊕ bij⟧i,⟦bij⟧j , ⟦bij⟧i⟩Paired(i,j)=true, ⟨⟦ri⟧i, ⟦βi⟧i⟩1≤i≤n, ⟨⟦mi⟧j⟩1≤i,j≤n.
For each m ∈ ViewS, SIMS chooses random bit strings of length ∣m∣.
Theorem 2. Let t ∈ N and τ < t. If the server S is non-colluding and the
AHE scheme is IND-CPA secure, then Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2 τ -privately
compute FKRE in the semi-honest model with leakage LS = Li = L. Hence, let
I = {i1, . . . , iτ}, LI = ⋃i∈I Li, there exists a simulator SIMI such that:
SIMI((xi1 , . . . , xiτ ),FKRE(x1, . . . , xn),LI) c≡ ViewI(x1, . . . , xn).
Proof (Proof (Sketch)). The leakage is clear as parties see only random strings
(IND-CPA ciphertexts, random shares or random bits).
In Kre-Ahe1 , all messages can be simulated by choosing random bit strings
of the corresponding length. However, the simulation of Step 19 must be coherent
with Step 25. Each client receives random shares in Step 19, runs the final
decryption Decf(.) in Step 25 and learns a random bit. Let Cl be a client with
l ∈ I. To simulate Steps 19 and 25, the simulator chooses t random values for
Step 19 such that running Decf(.) returns the random bit simulated in Step 25.
For example, if the underlying AHE is ECC ElGamal (ECE), then a cipher-
text has the form c = (α1, α2) = (r ⋅ P,m ⋅ P + r ⋅ pk). For each ECE ciphertext
c = (α1, α2) = (r ⋅ P,m ⋅ P + r ⋅ pk) that must be decrypted in Step 25, Cl gets
α2 and t partial decryption results α11, . . . , α1t of α1 in Step 19. To simulate
this, the simulator chooses a random bit b and a random α˜2. Then it computes
α˜1 = α˜2 − b ⋅ P and generates random α˜11, . . . , α˜1t such that ∑ti=1 α˜1i = α˜1 in G.
The proof for Kre-Ahe2 is similar. Ciphertexts and random shares are sim-
ulated with equally long random strings and Steps 18 and 22 in Kre-Ahe2 are
simulated as above for Steps 19 and 25 in Kre-Ahe1.
Theorem 3. Let t ∈ N and τ < t. If the server S is non-colluding and the
SHE scheme is IND-CPA secure, then Kre-She τ -privately computes FKRE
in the semi-honest model with leakage LS = Li = L. Hence, let I = {i1, . . . , iτ}
denote the indexes of corrupt clients, LI = ⋃i∈I Li denote their joint leakages
and ViewI(x1, . . . , xn) denote their joint views, there exists a simulator SIMI
such that:
SIMI((xi1 , . . . , xiτ ),FKRE(x1, . . . , xn),LI) c≡ ViewI(x1, . . . , xn).
Proof. The leakage is clear as parties see only random strings (IND-CPA cipher-
texts or partial decryption results). The security is also straightforward as the
computation is almost completely done by the server alone and encrypted under
an IND-CPA encryption. Moreover, the partial decryption reveals only partial
result to each decryptor.
Recall that our adversary is semi-honest. In Kre-Ygc, a server collusion
reveals all inputs to the adversary. In Kre-Ahe1 and Kre-Ahe2, a server col-
lusion only increase the leakage as long as the number of corrupted clients is
smaller than t. For example in Kre-Ahe1, the adversary can learn the order of
the inputs whose comparison bits are final decrypted by a corrupted client in
Step 25. In Kre-She, the KRE is homomorphically computed by the server such
that the clients are only required for the decryption of one ciphertext encrypting
the KRE. Moreover, the ciphertexts are encrypted using the threshold public key.
As a result, assuming semi-honest adversary and a collusion set containing less
than t clients, a server collusion leaks no more information than k,n, t, κ, λ, µ.
C Complexity analysis
In this section, we discuss the complexity of our schemes. We will use κ and λ
as length of asymmetric ciphertext and symmetric security parameter.
C.1 Kre-Ygc Protocol
A GC for the comparison of two µ-bit integers consists of µ AND-gates resulting
in 4µ symmetric ciphertexts [29, 30]. It can be reduced by a factor of 2 using
the halfGate optimization [38] at the cost of performing two cheap symmetric
operations (instead of one) during GC evaluation.
We do the analysis for the case where n is odd (the even case is similar). From
Lemma 3, each client generates (n − 1)/2 GCs resulting in (n − 1)µ symmetric
operations. The computation of encrypted comparison bits (Steps 6 to 16) and
the computation of the KRE’s ciphertext require O(n) asymmetric operations
to each client. Finally, each client has to decrypt one ciphertext in Step 23.
As a result, the computation complexity of each client is therefore O((n − 1)µ)
symmetric and O(2n+1) asymmetric operations. In communication, this results
in nκ bits for the asymmetric ciphertexts, 2µλ(n − 1)/2 bits for the GCs and
µλ(n− 1)/2 for the garbled inputs and nκ bits for handling the server’s leakage.
In total each client sends 2nκ + 3µλ(n−1)
2
.
The server evaluates n(n−1)/2 GCs each consisting of 2µ symmetric cipher-
texts. Computing the rank (Steps 17 to 19) requires O(n logn+n) operations to
the server. Finally, the server evaluates logn+n asymmetric operations to com-
pute the KRE ciphertext for each client (Steps 23 to 24). The total computation
complexity of the server is O(n(n−1)µ) symmetric and O((n+1) logn+2n). In
communication, the server sends n(n − 1) asymmetric ciphertexts in Steps 6 to
16, n asymmetric ciphertexts in Steps 17 to 19 and n asymmetric ciphertexts in
Steps 23 to 24. This results in a total of (n2 + n)κ bits.
C.2 Kre-Ahe1 Protocol
Each client performs O(µ) operations in Step 2, O(nµt) operations in Step 17,
O(nµt) operations in Step 24, O(log t) operations in Step 25, O(1) operations in
Step 28, eventually O(1) and O(n) operations in Steps 34 and 35, and O(log t)
operations in Step 38. This results in a total of O(µ + 2nµt + 2 log t + n + 1)
asymmetric operations.
Each client sends (2µ+1)κ bits in Step 2, nµtκ bits in Step 17, κ bits in Step
28, eventually nκ bits in Step 35. This results in a total of (2µ + nµt + n + 2)κ
bits for each client.
The main cryptographic operations of server happen in the evaluation of the
Lin-Tzeng protocol in Step 4. The comparison of two values takes 2µ asymmetric
operations. As a result the server performs O(2µn2) asymmetric operations for
all comparisons.
The server sends n2µtκ bits in Step 11 and (n2t+1)κ bits in Step 19, tκ bits
in Step 32 and ntκ bits in Step 37. This results in a total of (n2µt+n2t+nt+t+1)κ
bits for the server.
C.3 Kre-Ahe2 Protocol
Since Kre-Ahe2 also requires the predicate Paired as Kre-Ygc, we do the
analysis for the case where n is odd (the even case is similar).
Each client performs O(µ+1) operations in Step 2, O( 7µ(n−1)
2
) operations in
Step 5, O(t) operations in Step 16 and O(log t) in Step 21, O(n) operations in
Step 23 and O(1) operations in Step 26. This results in a total of O(µ+ 7µ(n−1)
2
+
t + log t + n + 1) asymmetric operations.
Each client sends (µ+1)κ bits in Step 2, κ(n−1)
2
bits (when the client is head)
and (µ+1)κ(n−1)
2
(when the client is tail) in Step 5, tκ bits in Step 16 and nκ bits
in Step 23. This results in a total of (µ (n+1)
2
+ 2n + t)κ bits for each client.
The cryptographic operations of the server happen in ComputeKreAhe
(Algorithm 6) that is called in Step 6 of Protocol 7. The server performs O(n2+n)
asymmetric operations.
The server sends (µκ+(µ+1)κ)n(n−1)
2
bits in Step 5, ntκ bits in Steps 12 and
18, nκ bits in Step 25. This results in a total of ( (2µ+1)n(n−1)
2
+2nt+n)κ bits for
the server.
C.4 Kre-She Protocol
Each client has O(µ) computation cost (µ+1 encryptions in Step 2 and eventually
one partial decryption in Step 10) and a communication cost of (µ+n+1)κ bits.
The cryptographic operations of the server happen in ComputeKreShe
(Algorithm 8) that is called in Step 4 of Protocol 9. The SHE comparison circuit
has depth log(µ − 1) + 1 and requires O(µ logµ) homomorphic multiplications
[11, 12]. For all comparisons the server performs, therefore, O(n2µ logµ) multi-
plication. In Step 10 of Algorithm 8, the computation of ⟦∏nj=1,j≠k(ri − j)⟧ has
depth logn and requires O(n logn) homomorphic multiplications. Step 12 of
Algorithm 8 adds an additional circuit depth and requires O(n) homomorphic
multiplications. As a result, Algorithm 8 has a total depth of log(µ−1)+ logn+2
and requires O(n2µ logµ + n logn + n) homomorphic multiplications.
The server sends tκ bits in Step 7 and ntκ bits in Step 12 resulting in a total
of (t + nt)κ bits.
